Group, superintended the defence of Germany south of Kassel. The possibility of a surprise attack by the numerically superior Warsaw Pact forces, together with BAOR's situation within the divided state of Germany, meant that great importance was attached to intelligence, warning and rapid mobilisation. Despite the considerable attention that historians have given to Cold War espionage, we know surprisingly little about the intelligence dimension of BAOR and its interface with Allied intelligence through NORTHAG and NATO. How was intelligence configured to support these multinational NATO commands, which had only a limited peacetime existence? How would they have faired under the exigencies of surprise attack? This article attempts to address these neglected issues for the period for which recent archives are available, ending with the impact of the Yom Kippur War upon NATO thinking about warning and surprise in the period 1973-5. 1 It is often asserted that during the Cold War the entity referred to as 'NATO intelligence' did not really exist, at least as a collection agency. In reality, NATO organisations were largely fed with intelligence by the various national components, some of whom kept the alliance on a rather meagre diet of low-grade material. In wartime, these restrictions on intelligence supplied to NATO would have been removed and the situation would have moved rapidly from famine to feast. This was certainly true at the level of the main NATO political headquarters based in Paris and then, after 1967, at Evere on the outskirts of Brussels. Improbably, the Allied contingency plans for war involved sending a deluge of additional and unfamiliar intelligence material to NATO amid the panic caused by an impending Warsaw Pact attack. Moreover, the structure of intelligence support for NATO at its higher levels was always rather awkward. This constituted a source of growing anxiety for planners as NATO nuclear decision-making grew in importance during the 1960s. Intelligence mechanisms were unlikely to function smoothly or speedily in the first few days of war when they were perhaps most vital, resulting in slow target acquisition. These concerns NORTHAG's wartime intelligence priorities were also shaped by political considerations.
The danger of surprise attack meant that, for all levels of NATO during the Cold War, war warning was perhaps the most important intelligence task. Here, intelligence enjoyed something of a tripwire function, an attribute that became yet more significant with the growing importance of battlefield nuclear weapons during the 1960s. Beyond the war-warning phase, the operational intelligence priorities of NORTHAG diverged significantly from the political and strategic intelligence that was required by national capitals or by the main NATO HQ in Brussels. Operational interest was focused on deep battlefield intelligence that combined surveillance of enemy movements with meteorological and topographical information. In practice this translated into a need for intelligence over the NORTHAG front and extending beyond the forward edge of the battle area to a minimum distance of about 200 km and ideally about 500 km. During the first forty-eight hours of war, the most demanding priority would have been near real-time intelligence on enemy movements in this zone. This was essential to allow NORTHAG to concentrate its resources against enemy thrusts, rather than dispersing its forces thinly and evenly along the Inner German Border. This was also to provide current target intelligence for the tasking of artillery and air operations to slow the enemy down during the crucial early stages of an attack. Anxiety about a guaranteed flow of this sort of intelligence reflected concern that NORTHAG was under-resourced for its task, a problem that was only resolved by the loan of two American brigades in the 1970s. 10 NORTHAG's intelligence concerns were rendered more complex by the structural changes that would have been required as a proper multinational NORTHAG Headquarters came into being on the eve of war, and then moved to its wartime 'survival' location. From 1954, BAOR enjoyed a purpose-built peacetime headquarters west of the Rhine at Rheindahlen near Mönchengladbach. However, on receipt of war warning, the inhabitants would have 'crashed out' to a secret survival location, rumoured to be in the vast forests near Aachen, meanwhile making use of an additional rear HQ in some crumbling underground caves at Maastricht. The problem of maintaining a satisfactory intelligence flow would have been repeated as the command used its mobile elements to leap-frog to new locations, in the hope of evading detection by the enemy. Confusion would be compounded by a poor communications infrastructure and an influx of reserve staff, some of whom would be unfamiliar with procedures.
Intelligence mechanisms were unlikely to function smoothly or speedily in the first few days of war when they were perhaps most vital, resulting in slow target acquisition. These concerns intensified during the 1960s because NORTHAG intelligence was increasingly conscious of the ability of Warsaw Pact forces to operate equally well by night as well as day and perhaps under a blanket of near radio-silence. In the period up to 1973, NATO commanders repeatedly identified a need for effective deep reconnaissance at night and in bad visibility, but these requirements were only met in the late 1970s and 1980s through the advent of sophisticated new technologies.
NORTHAG's wartime intelligence priorities were also shaped by political considerations.
West German sensitivities over the surrender of territory during a Warsaw Pact offensive required NORTHAG to plan for a forward battle, with perhaps even West German armoured counter-thrusts into the east. In turn, this meant the forward positioning of forces, which could only be achieved with ample warning. Local German political considerations were also intimately tied to what one author has called 'NATO's nuclear dilemmas'.
11 West Germany was not keen to see the use of nuclear weapons, even of a tactical sort, on its own soil, and yet holding Warsaw Pact forces on the border seemed almost impossible without their early release.
As early as 1951, the UK Chiefs of Staff had identified tactical nuclear weapons as an attractive way of 'compensating for our numerical inferiority vis a vis the Russians' and an effective way for dealing with 'Russian mass tactics' in the opening stages of an offensive. Senior UK commanders routinely assumed that they would be employed by both sides in any European ground war. 12 This sort of thinking placed a high premium on intelligence quickly locating the main enemy thrusts as targets for conventional artillery, and then perhaps as targets for tactical nuclear weapons, as well as seeking to blunt any similar Soviet tactical nuclear capability. It also raised the controversial question of 'demolitions' that were scheduled to be implemented by a shadowy mixture civilian and military of stay-behind parties at bridges and other key points.
These demolitions were initially conventional and consisted of lorry-loads of high explosive, but by the 1960s demolitions were increasingly to be achieved by 'special atomic demolition munitions' or SADMs. Accordingly, the preparations for the intense first hours of war that were developed by NORTHAG planners were highly secret and connected to both intelligence and special operations.
These difficult issues first reared their head in the mid-1950s and manifested themselves as requirements for stronger intelligence and communications systems at every NATO level.
Thereafter, as policy-makers engaged with flexible response in the late 1960s, the outcome was a doctrine of risk manipulation that deliberately mixed conventional forces and theatre nuclear forces surprisingly far forward, making inadvertent escalation probable once war commenced. 13 As a result, an improved communications became paramount not only to distribute intelligence, but also assumed 'a particular importance in the light of the need for nuclear release request messages'. 14 In short, during the late 1960s, commanders were grappling with an inadequate physical infrastructure of command, communications and intelligence for NORTHAG -and indeed throughout NATO -which was some ten years behind the burdens that these new doctrines imposed. A related, but often unspoken high intelligence priority for NORTHAG was 'the acquisition of targets of the enemy's nuclear delivery means, even if the battle is at that time being fought conventionally'. Signals intelligence or 'sigint' was thought to be especially important for any attempt to locate Soviet nuclear capable elements.
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Alerts and associated matters of transition to war were always controversial within NATO. SACEUR enjoyed two different alert systems at this time, the first was the Formal Alert
System designed for a period of gradually escalating tension that permitted full political consultation. The second was the Supreme Allied Commander Europe's (SACEUR) CounterSurprise Military Systems, inaugurated in March 1959, which was designed for an 'acute emergency' and allowed him to take measures to ensure the survivability of his forces if confronted with a sudden attack. 16 This second system connected warning and alert systems to states of readiness, mobilisation of reserves and practical measures such as aircraft dispersal.
War warning also raised complicated matters of access to national intelligence and national control over strategic intelligence assets on the brink of war. In the early 1960s there was an ongoing debate over exactly how SACEUR's Counter-Surprise Military Systems should work given that much of NATO would only receive certain types of strategic intelligence, such as high-grade sigint, after war had broken out and after some crucial decisions had been taken.
These problems were very much in the minds of commanders at the operational level of command, typically NORTHAG. The core was a series of intelligence cells that worked closely with operations and planning sections at every level of the NORTHAG structure. During the late 1960s and early 1970s there were some efforts to undertake operational analysis on how the NORTHAG intelligence system would work under wartime pressure. The main problems that were identified related to communications and data overload. Predictably, communications above corps level (intra-NORTHAG) were bad, partly because of the complex politics of procuring NATO communications systems. Intelligence was often filtered at each HQ before being passed on, slowing the process down. Typically, an intelligence cell at the divisional level was expected to cope with some 250 messages an hour. However, they lacked a terminal on the command net and received much of their feed from G Ops, which in practice meant they would have to sift operational material in an attempt to keep track of a fast moving battle. In short, the main problem was information overload, greatly compounded by communications bottlenecks, since much time was taken up with encypherment. In common with much of NATO, many NORTHAG intelligence elements lacked access to a secure voice system.
NORTHAG intelligence officers who ran these cells also complained that they were prisoners of outmoded procedure. During exercises, they spent much of their time compiling
Intsums and Combintsums that were thought to be of limited value to commanders. They were especially doubtful that these would be read in the fast-moving context of the first few days of a conflict. In wartime, much of the work of the intelligence cells of NORTHAG's four constituent corps would have been 'pattern recognition', trying to understand the particular Soviet operational structures that were being used at any stage of the battle. Not all G Int officers were trained in this sort of intelligence work. Here the operational research teams reviewing NORTHAG intelligence identified the need for more analytical training, having found that some officers were often seriously hampered by 'preconceived ideas'. After one exercise they noted that in this instance the enemy plans remained concealed from the intelligence officer in question the end simply because 'information which did not confirm his preconceived ideas he ignored as being false'.
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Intelligence Collection in Peacetime
In the early years, NORTHAG commanders complained repeatedly of weak information on their adversary. Initially this charge was justified. In January 1952, General John Harding, who oversaw the creation of NORTHAG, observed that our 'intelligence cover of Eastern Germany and Poland on which we must depend for warning of attack, and information on Russian and Satellite forces is poor and deteriorating'. He urged that 'no effort be spared' to improve it. The
Directorate of Military Intelligence in London readily accepted Harding's critique of intelligence, observing that this 'is realised only too well' and while work was afoot to improve matters it was expected to take 'some time'. 29 However, this comment also reflected NORTHAG's hierarchy of priorities. Although they desired intelligence on Warsaw Pact capabilities, and indeed were ever was already enormous. 33 Perhaps even more important with regard to Germany was a further penetration agent, the SIS officer George Blake. Unbeknown to his superiors, he was influenced from a young age by members of his family who were committed communists. Stationed in Seoul, he was taken prisoner by the North Koreans in 1950 and during his confinement he volunteered to work for the KGB. After his release, he served as a senior officer in the SIS Berlin station where he provided details of perhaps 400 western agents to the Soviets. Blake remained active until he was he was exposed by Michael Goleniewksi, a defecting Polish security service officer, who came over to the CIA in 1959. 34 The equivalent German service, the BND, seems to have faired little better. In November 1961, Heinz Felfe, a senior BND officer was arrested after it was discovered that he had been a double-agent for the Soviets for many years. Felfe had been a senior wartime SS security officer and was first recruited by the British SIS in 1946 and operated in Muenster. By the 1950s he was working for the BND and inflicted serious damage on their operations in the East. The communists enjoyed detailed knowledge of German intelligence structures, staffs and agents. Accordingly, many agents that had been recruited by SIS and the BND were arrested and later executed. Although the most daring of these sigint operations, the Berlin Tunnel, was compromised by George Blake, it remained effective for some time since the KGB did not inform their compatriots for fear of compromising their well-placed agent. 37 Moreover, the British, American and Germans all operated further sigint operations along the inner German Border, also at RAF Gatow in Berlin and after 1957, from Teufelsberg, the highest point in Berlin. This salient location was designed to offer line of sight interception of VHF communications. However, the biggest problem for the dual-hatted intelligence chief at NORTHAG, who was also BAOR's intelligence chief, was access to UK product. The best technical intelligence systems were national assets. So tasking was at best indirect and distribution of product was limited to what London thought advisable. A local Government Communications Unit (GCU) distributed medium grade sigint to the Commander of BAOR and his senior staff officers. 38 However, only low-grade sigint could be circulated to and from NATO partners through multinational Special
Handling Detachments (SHDs). Order of Battle material provided to NORTHAG (constructed largely from low-grade sigint) was excellent, but access to other material was intermittent.
Problems of access were evident for subordinate elements such 2ATAF. Although much intelligence work in Berlin was undertaken by RAF sigint units in Berlin, often the product was not passed to the frontline customers in RAF Germany for security reasons. Even the NORTHAG commander was not in receipt of really high-grade sigint during peacetime. 39 Accordingly, commanders in Germany were always anxious to expand their own considerable peacetime collection and analysis resources. An early development was the Scientific and Technical Intelligence Bureau, which was perhaps the most important intelligence unit within the Intelligence Division of Control Commission Germany. This unit was responsible for interrogating returning Germans POWs and civilians who has been in the East. Because the Soviets retained German POWs for more than a decade after the end of the war and used them extensively on military and industrial projects they provided an invaluable source of intelligence on a vast range of Soviet projects, including atomic programmes. The volume of these activities was vast and the quality of the product was high. Indeed, during the 1950s, in terms of military intelligence that was of direct value to NORTHAG, these activities were probably as valuable as the material provided by BND and SIS. 40 The other major collection asset was the British Commander-in-Chief's Mission to the Their roving patrols were increasingly conscious of operational break-out drills conducted by entire divisions under radio silence. BRIXMIS teams discovered that the GDR had also installed elaborate networks of landlines that provided for communications to remote locations that were immune to interception. Exactly how much warning of the coming of war NATO would receive was a matter of constant debate at all levels of command. The lower the command echelon, the more gloomy the prevailing opinion tended to be.
Intelligence Collection and Special Forces in War
Although School run by German officers at Weingarten in Bavaria. 50 It is widely accepted that some of the American special forces units were equipped with Atomic Demolition Munitions (ADMs) in an attempt to slow the advance of Soviet armour. 51 Although ADMs posed serious problems of contamination because they would have generated a great deal of fallout, they were nevertheless popular with military planners since they were considered to be more defensive and less escalatory than other types of tactical nuclear weapons. 52 Although kept highly confidential, the use of demolitions by joint teams of engineers, sappers and special forces, had long been part of Western plans to slow an advancing enemy in the first few hours of war. In the 1950s the emphasis was on conventional demolitions. As early as July 1950, General Lawton Collins, the US Army Chief of Staff wrote to his British counterpart, William Slim explaining that he was 'thoroughly convinced of the great value of carrying out these strategic demolitions' and urging the allocation of more engineer teams to the task. 53 In 1952, UK commanders in Germany were also arguing for 'the most extensive use of demolitions' in war planning for Europe. 54 All these commanders gave importance to coordinating demolition activities across Germany -and indeed even into Austria. In April 1952, the UK Chiefs of Staff had initiated discussions with the Austrian Chancellor on the matter and had agreed to send an 'M.I.6. technical adviser to advise the Austrian authorities on strategic demolitions there in the event of war'. 55 Indeed, by this point there was clearly a co-ordinated allied plan for a chain of demolitions extending on through southern Europe, the Mediterranean and the Middle East, where the CIA seem to have had the majority of the responsibility for oil denial. 56 By the early 1960s there was growing emphasis was upon atomic demolitions. During 1963, NORTHAG were planning to deploy two types of ADMs, one with a yield of 2 kt and one with a yield of 10 kt, the latter primarily with a view to bridge demolition. 57 had been renamed the Royal Navy Rhine Flotilla -a veritable inland navy -which was upgraded in 1950 to a peacetime strength of some thirty craft. 65 At the same time, the personnel from the Royal Marines Demolition Unit, many of whom were trained frogmen, were re-organised to form 2 and 3 Special Boat Service squadrons who were given designated demolition and staybehind roles on the Rhine. In war they would have been joined by 4 and 5 Special Boat Service squadrons which were territorial units. This flotilla co-operated with US Navy's Rhine River
Patrol at Karslruhe and the French Forces Maritimes du Rhin based at Koblenz. A key role for these units was using demolition munitions to destroy bridges over rivers, not only on the Rhine but also the Weser and Elbe. 66 They were also tasked to sow the more attractive crossing points with thousands of mines and to destroy craft that might assist the enemy with river crossings. difficult problem'. As well as attacking various bridges, they were required to sink or severely damage some 1500 to 2000 vessels in 'an incredibly short space of time'. This was thought to be between three to five days. Whatever had not been done by then would have to be finished off by the Special Boat Service 'in territory occupied by the enemy'. 67 As early as 1950, a requirement for some 18,000 limpet mines for the Allied Rhine Flotillas and associated commando units had been raised. were found within the first six hours by the patrols and dogs were 'highly successful' throughout the trials. Even more remarkable was success with electronic warfare sensor vehicles. To the surprise of the research teams, these intercepted not only hand-speed morse but also, burstencrypted traffic. DF bearings were achieved at ranges of up to 12 kilometres and accurate bearings using triangulation between three vehicles were achieved at ranges of 5 kilometres. By contrast, airborne systems whether deployed by aircraft or helicopter revealed almost nothing.
These tests prompted a decision to try to develop better communications equipment for staybehind parties, which were now recognised as highly vulnerable. 69 Partly because of the problem of moving special forces forward at short notice and getting demolitions into place in time, further undercover plans had been formulated by commanders. From the outset NORTHAG had also counted on an additional secret force of civilians who would conduct a mixture of intelligence reporting, sabotage and demolition work.
One of the originators of this activity appears to be General John Harding, who oversaw the emergence of NORTHAG in the early 1950s. He observed:
Our chances of imposing effective delay on the enemy's advance east of the Rhine will depend largely on the success of our demolition plans. All practicable preparations must be made beforehand to make the plan effective, including the organisation of a German manned stay behind sabotage organisation. A great deal still requires to be done in these respects.
Harding saw this civilian organisation carrying out demolitions in order to give his defensive forces time to get into position in the opening few hours of the campaign during which the 'time margin will be very narrow'. Thereafter he saw them as attacking targets such as enemy fuel supplies. He repeatedly emphasised that to 'pay the highest possible dividend such an organisation should be German manned'. 70 By the end of the 1950s such an organisation had come into being. Often referred to by its code-name 'Gladio' it was controlled by the Allied Clandestine Committee at SHAPE and was active throughout the Cold War. This was worrying because electronic warfare was one of the few planned intelligence sources for determining the location of enemy headquarters. Sigint specialists feared that the Soviets might be routinely 'remoting' the radios associated with their major headquarters at distance of 2 km in which the effectiveness of NORTHAG's direction finding efforts would be 'drastically reduced'. Their only hope was that under the stress of war, Warsaw Pact communications security might lapse, but this was by no means certain. Indeed, some predicted that for the first twenty-four hours the Warsaw Pact might advance on pre-designated lines and keep near-radio silence.
NORTHAG's senior offices clearly had high hopes that their tactical EW/Sigint organisation would provide a continual flow of information on enemy deployment patterns as well as intentions in the first few hours of war. They also desired information on the 'location of enemy headquarters and missile launching sites'. However, in reality only FROG missile launching sites were likely to within range, while the more important SCUD missile sites would have been outside the typical operating range of tactical sigint, which was widely thought to be only 40-50km. NORTHAG was intrigued by the American decision to introduce airborne tactical sigint systems, but were sceptical about its ability to perform given that they would have to fly well back from the battle area in order to survive, perhaps picking up mostly allied transmission and background noise. 72 In fact, these sorts of systems -known as 'Guardrail' -were introduced in the 1970s by the US Army in CENTAG and proved highly effective. 73 It is likely that the arrival of these valuable operational sigint collectors for the US Army reflected good previous experiences during the 1960s with the U-2 aircraft which had undertaken regular perimeter sigint flights around the Eastern Bloc.
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The biggest limitation on NORTHAG's own local ground-based sigint capability was range of intercept. The primary mode of Warsaw Pact command and control was VHF radio and the range over which this could be intercepted was 40-50 kilometres. This reflected both transmitter power and also the need for line of sight interception. Accordingly, it was possible to meet Divisional Comint requirements, but problems would have occurred at the level of Corps and above who needed to see further behind the front line. Accordingly, intelligence would only be gained from ground based VHF intercept on Warsaw Pact reserve divisions when it was too late for the Corps HQs, or Northag HQ to react. Limitations of range also required sigint collectors to be based as far forward as possible, exposing them to risk and forcing them to move frequently, which was not 'conducive to the best COMINT collection'. Had war broken out prior to 1970, NORTHAG would have turned to traditional air reconnaissance with cameras by 2ATAF for longer-range intelligence. 79 However, both 2ATAF
and also 4ATAF (who supported CENTAG) had limited reconnaissance resources in Germany.
Moreover this source of intelligence would have diminished quickly because an aircraft casualty rate of some 60% was expected over the first 7 days of any engagement with the Soviets.
Attrition rates were much debated by senior commanders with some pessimists suggesting a 'Pearl Harbor' type scenario in which a high proportion of NATO airfields might be eliminated in series of early and successful pre-emptive strikes which 'could result in few aircraft surviving to carry out reconnaissance'. Most observers agreed that once battle commenced, aircraft vulnerability would require low flying which in turn would limit the area that could be surveyed by airborne sensors. Effectiveness was also hampered by a tendency to retain aircraft under centralised control, which meant that requests for reconnaissance had to travel through several commands before being met. By 1969 this problem was being addressed with plans to allocate some reconnaissance aircraft directly to individual Corps within in NORTHAG and to give more helicopters to armoured reconnaissance units. he had provided the Rumanian intelligence service with at least 5,000 NATO documents including Cosmic Top Secret material. As with Imre, he was caught as the result of information from a high-level Rumanian defector secured by the Americans. 87 The UK Chiefs of Staff now took a 'very grave view' of developments and were anxious to make sure that issues arising from it were not 'swept under the carpet'. There were many voices in London who now argued that the UK was putting its own forces at risk 'by passing too much information to NATO'. 88 Notwithstanding all this, the development of a GCHQ cell for NATO at Evere still went ahead. One may well ask why, given the repeated security breaches in the late 1960s? The answer probably lay in the modest nature of the proposal for improved sigint that had emerged from the Working Group set up by NATO's Special Committee. This was narrowly focused on intelligence that might influence 'a timely decision to release nuclear weapons'. It was specifically about intelligence during the critical period between consultation on a developing security situation and request for the release or use of nuclear weapons. In other words, there was never any intention to supply NATO's political machine with sigint on a regular basis under normal peacetime conditions. Instead it only sought to regularise the position that had occurred during Middle East War of 1967. During this earlier crisis, the UK and the USA had provided NATO with most of its intelligence, based largely on sigint, requiring the laborious production of 'specially tailored' documents that provided detail on the situation without compromising sources. 89 No less important during the late 1960s was the recognition of the need for higher-grade command and communications links between NATO and its constituent commands. it has yet to be exercised against a surprise attack'. 92 Off-setting some of these anxieties, the early 1970s saw improving East-West relations.
The Soviets had become embroiled in border clashes with the Chinese and, together with Nixon's decision to play the 'China card', this had prompted Moscow to seek Détente with the West. An agreement that defused tensions over Berlin was signed in March 1970. More important was the treaty signed between East and West Germany in December 1972 which allowed both to members of United Nations. 93 All this was accompanied by arms control agreements and confidence building measures that were underpinned by verification. Improved satellite systems supported these agreements and also went some way to addressing anxieties about warning and surprise. Arguably, the emergence of CSCE, with its emphasis on the avoidance of crisis and surprise, also reflected a growing recognition that the command and control systems on both sides were fundamentally ill-suited to rapid decision making under pressure.
Despite the centrality of this subject, our knowledge remains incomplete and many questions remain to be answered. In 1954 the UK Cabinet Office still boasted an Enemy Documents Section.
